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The Tunnels that Connect
Hampton Roads
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The opening of the first major tunnel connecting the Peninsula with Southside (the
3.5-mile Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel in 1957) changed matters dramatically.
Now it was possible for automobiles and trucks to travel back and forth
between the Peninsula and Southside directly and with comparative ease. This
cut many miles and considerable time off such a trip and might well be
regarded as a definitive move in support of the notion of a region called
Hampton Roads.
Four other major tunnels exist in our area: the .65-mile Downtown Tunnel (1952)
and the .8-mile Midtown Tunnel (1962), connecting Norfolk and Portsmouth;
the 17.6-mile Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel (1964), linking Virginia Beach to
the Eastern Shore; and the 4.6-mile Monitor Merrimac Memorial Bridge-Tunnel
(1992), connecting Suffolk and Newport News.   
Taken together, these five bridge/tunnel complexes unite the region and stimu-
late commerce. Without them, the bustling Port of Hampton Roads would be a
shadow of what we see today because trucks handle significant proportions of
the goods that flow through the port. The bridges and tunnels also provide crit-
ical infrastructure to support the numerous Department of Defense installations
and activities within the region. And, during hurricane season, they provide the
promise of serving as evacuation routes.  
A recitation of the positive impact of our region’s bridges and tunnels on eco-
nomic and social life in Hampton Roads virtually begs the question: What if
they were closed, for whatever reason, or were rendered inoperable for long
periods of time? 
Are European Examples
 Relevant to Hampton Roads?
Tunnel incidents since 1995 have killed 713 people worldwide. Among the
highly publicized have been:
 Mont Blanc Tunnel Fire (March
1999): The Mont Blanc Tunnel con-
nects Italy and France. This disaster
(41 deaths) occurred when a truck
carrying nine tons of margarine and
12 tons of flour caught fire. All but
seven of those who died stayed in
their cars rather than attempt to
access “escape” rooms located inside the tunnel, though it is not clear
they could have survived even had they tried. The fires burned for two
days. Opened in 1965, the Mont Blanc Tunnel was designed for
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THE TUNNELS THAT CONNECT HAMPTON ROADS:
WONDERFUL ASSETS OR POTENTIAL ACHILLES’ HEELS?
Achilles’ Heel: a metaphor describing a potentially fatal weakness despite overall strength
H
ampton Roads hosts the second-largest seaport on the Atlantic Coast and the largest naval base in the world. Its very existence is defined by the Atlantic Ocean
and the many bodies of water that flow from many parts of Virginia into the ocean. Waterways such as the James River once profoundly divided the region.
In 1930, an individual wishing to travel from downtown Hampton to downtown Norfolk faced two choices – a long and circuitous land trip that could
approach 25 miles (via the James River Bridge on Route 17, which opened in 1928), or a boat ride.  
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450,000 vehicles per year, but already was handling 1.1 million vehi-
cles annually by 1997.
 Tauern Tunnel Accident/Fire (May 1999): The Tauern Tunnel is located
near Salzburg, Austria, and was only two lanes at the time of the acci-
dent, which was caused by an early-morning collision and fire involving
60 trucks and killing 12 people.  
 Gotthard Tunnel Accident/Fire (October 2001): Located in Switzerland,
this tunnel is more than 10 miles long. A collision between two trucks
resulted in fires that killed 12 people, primarily from smoke and heat
that reached more than 1,800 degrees. 
 Channel Tunnel Fires (November 1996, August 2006, September
2008): The Channel Tunnel connects the United Kingdom and France.
Three significant fires aboard trains have closed the tunnel since it
opened in 1994.
What lessons did Europeans learn from these accidents (none of which involved
terrorism)?
 Tunnels are constantly vulnerable to accidents and mishaps that not only
result in deaths, but also close them to traffic for periods of time –
ranging up to three years, as was the case following the Mont Blanc
Tunnel fire.
 Some fires in tunnels are virtually unavoidable and therefore are consid-
ered to be routine incidents. (The Lincoln and Holland tunnels in New
York City each experience several car fires per year.) The possibility of
fire requires that routine, easily implemented protocols exist to deal with
such occurrences.
 Bidirectional (two-lane) tunnels are substantially more susceptible to acci-
dents than dual (twin-tube) carriageway tunnels.
 Not surprisingly, tunnels that allow transiting vehicles to carry flammable
and explosive materials are susceptible to much more destructive acci-
dents. Convincing drivers not to carry illegal materials through tunnels is
a never-ending task.
 Bad driving and unwise employee judgments have caused nearly every
major tunnel accident. Terrorism might produce the same effects, but no
major tunnel disaster has been the result of terrorism, although English
authorities reported they foiled an attempt by Islamic terrorists to blow
up the Channel Tunnel in 2006.   
 The first 10 minutes are decisive when it comes to saving people’s lives
and limiting material damage (e.g., in the case of the Gotthard Tunnel
accident, experts were surprised by how rapidly toxic fumes spread and
visibility declined; this led to the loss of life).
 Tunnel users often fail to recognize emergency signs, which has resulted
in fatal consequences for those trying to escape. 
 The probability of a tunnel accident increases as the volume of traffic in
the tunnel increases.  
 It is possible to screen many, but not all, potentially dangerous cargoes
before they enter tunnels; however, the costs associated with detecting
sophisticated dangers (for example, those relating to radiation) can be
very high.
 Among the most efficient and low-cost means of reducing the frequency
and severity of tunnel accidents are: (1) mandating smaller fuel tanks for
heavy-goods vehicles; (2) providing tunnels with heat-seeking cameras;
(3) restricting the amount of fuel that heavy-goods vehicles may carry
into a tunnel; (4) requiring certain vehicles to carry fire-extinguishing
equipment; and (5) regulating distances between vehicles.
Readers will recognize that several of the recommended precautions could be
implemented immediately in our region’s tunnels, but others (such as regulating
distances between vehicles) would cause immediate problems. We can only
wish good luck to any authority that attempts to enforce meaningful “distance
between vehicles” regulations in the Downtown and Midtown tunnels during
weekday rush hours.  
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How Vulnerable Are We in
Hampton Roads?
It should come as no surprise that regional authorities are paying increased
attention to Hampton Roads’ bridge-tunnel vulnerabilities and are actively
involved in assessing emergency preparedness and critical infrastructure protec-
tion plans. Addressing these risks and mitigating their potential impacts remain
top priorities, not only among the general public, but also with Hampton Roads
policy makers.
Let’s look at some of the considerations. The overall level of risk to one of our
tunnels due to an adverse event is a function of three primary factors:
a. Importance Factor (I) – This is a straightforward measure of the socioeco-
nomic importance of a tunnel and its operation. Typically, a quantitative
measure is developed to account for the following attributes of the tunnel: 
1. Financial importance to the regional economy 
2. Importance to the regional transportation network 
3. Importance as an emergency evacuation route 
4. Exposed population in the tunnel when the adverse event occurs
b. Occurrence Factor (O) – This variable measures the probability of an
adverse event occurring. Most often, this measure takes the following into
account: 
1. Level of exposure to risk events
2. Level of security 
3. Frequency of exposure to adverse events (e.g., frequency of large-truck
traffic with potentially dangerous cargoes)
c. Vulnerability Factor (V) – This variable measures the consequences of an
adverse event to the tunnel, its occupants and neighboring populations. It usu-
ally incorporates the following measures: 
1. Expected financial damage to the tunnel 
2. Expected replacement value 
3. Expected downtime or closure of the tunnel 
4. Expected number of casualties (deaths or severe injuries)
5. Value of reduced economic activity.
The I, O and V factors enable risk evaluators to evaluate the impact of adverse
events. Let’s delve into this process in more detail to get a better sense of how
this occurs.  
Table 1 provides an example of how the Importance, Occurrence and Vulnera-
bility factors might be defined and developed. It uses ranges (low to high), likeli-
hoods and expected losses (denoted by red, yellow and green, which
correspond to high, medium and low severity) to describe a given adverse
event in one of the region’s five tunnels. A 1-5 scale is used to assign probabili-
ties (least likely to most likely) and losses (smallest to largest) to each adverse
event to which a tunnel might be exposed.  
Table 2 extends this analysis to the five tunnels in Hampton Roads for 2008 to
reflect the size of monetary and human losses connected to an adverse event.
The next step is to translate Table 2’s values into a scale that varies between 0
and 1. The translation in Table 3 is based upon a “fuzzy” equation where the
translated factor is equivalent to the average of the values for all risk events,
divided by 10. The translation for the importance factor is a one-to-one map-
ping where an assessment of “high” corresponds to a value of 1, an assessment
of “medium” corresponds to .50 and an assessment of “low” corresponds to a
value of 0, etc.
Finally, let’s take the values of Table 3 and translate them into an overall risk pri-
oritization score (RPS) that takes into account all three factors (importance, fre-
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quency of occurrence and vulnerability). The risk prioritization scores in Table 4
are the product of the equation RPS  = I • O • V. These scores enable us to
say that, all things considered, the Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel (HRBT) merits
our greatest attention if and when we worry about adverse events. Taking
into account the HRBT’s importance, the likelihood of an
adverse event occurring there, and its potential vulnerability,
the HRBT receives the highest risk ranking. The lowest risk
ranking belongs to the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel (CBBT)
and hence it merits the least attention of any of the five tun-
nels when we consider how to deal with adverse events. Note
that “least attention” is not equivalent to “no attention.” Adverse events (e.g., car
and truck accidents, flooding, fire) are fully capable of causing significant prob-
lems at the CBBT. However, all things considered, these problems are much
smaller for the CBBT than is the case for the HRBT and MMBT.
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ADVERSE EVENT EXAMPLES FOR THE FIVE
HAMPTON ROADS TUNNELS











Flooding 3 3 2
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Flooding 3 4 1
Fire 1 2 1
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Regional Infrastructure
 Independence
The tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, in New York City and at the Pentagon
served to re-emphasize what often is termed the “cascade” effect. The major
building blocks of a modern urban civilization are interrelated and interde-
pendent. When one part of New York City’s infrastructure was destroyed or
failed, this rippled into other parts of the city and knocked out other vital func-
tions as well.  
Suppose a destructive hurricane were to hit Hampton Roads. Likely, it would
knock out electricity, disrupt natural gas delivery, diminish our ability to communi-
cate, limit our ability to access television and radio, and perhaps flood or block
off one or more tunnels. Clearly, our ability to deal with any one of these
calamities depends at least partially upon the continuing operation of the
remaining pieces of infrastructure.  
Unfortunately, somewhat like a domino effect, the destruction of one piece of
infrastructure (electrical service) often does impede or even knock down other
pieces of infrastructure (television and radio reception and, in the case of New
York City, subways). Hence, any analysis of the impact of adverse events upon
our region’s tunnels must be approached from an overall systems point of view.
Everything is related and the experience of 9/11 reveals that infrastructure fail-
ures often cascade. Both foresight and wise planning are required to minimize
the probability that infrastructure failures spread like a contagious disease. 
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TABLE 3
A SCALE FOR ADVERSE EVENTS:
THE FIVE HAMPTON ROADS TUNNELS
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Final Reflection:
Accidents and Terrorism
All of the major European tunnel episodes that we described earlier were
accidents and not the result of terrorist actions. Even so, a terrorist,
 especially a suicidal terrorist, could replicate the tragic results of these
 accidents. In fact, Hampton Roads is vulnerable to terrorist
attacks directed against many different key components of
its infrastructure – not just bridges and tunnels, but also
electrical, natural gas and water supplies, and tall build-
ings. The possibility of chemical and radiation attacks on
the region, or even the  detonation of small atomic
weapons, cannot be  discarded due to the overriding
importance of the  military installations located in our
midst. Prudence requires that we be mindful of and
 prepare for such possibilities.    
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